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ENGINEERING THE ENDGAME
Ellen D. Katz*
This Article explores what happens to longstanding remedies for
past racial discriminationas conditions change. It shows that Congress and the Supreme Court have responded quite differently to
changed conditions when they evaluate such remedies. Congress
has generally opted to stay the course, while the Court has been
more inclined to view change as cause to terminate a remedy. The
Article argues that these very different responses share a defining
flaw, namely, they treat existing remedies as fixed until they are
terminated.As a result, remedies are either scrappedprematurely
or left stagnantdespite dramaticallychanged conditions.
The Article seeks to map out a better response to changed conditions than the all-or-nothing options that presently define the
debate. It argues that longstanding remedies should neither be terminated nor continued indefinitely, but insteadshould be adapted to
better addresschanged circumstances. Specifically, the Article calls
for a shift in remedialfocus away from the effects of past discrimination to the local institutions that must deal with those effects most
directly. It calls on courts, legislators,and voters to adapt remedies
so that they provide institutions of local governance with the skills
and resources needed to operate fairly in an environment inexorably shaped by past discriminationand in which some effects endure.
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INTRODUCTION

When should a remedy for racial discrimination end? The question
comes up again and again. Has the time come to scrap the regional provisions of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA")? Or to dissolve a longstanding
school desegregation decree? Is it now appropriate to get rid of affirmative
action in university admissions or to discard the disparate impact tests that
inhere in federal voting and employment law? Put differently, when is
enough really enough?
Some effects of past discrimination are more lasting than others, and
people and institutions differ in their willingness and ability to address persistent problems. But these factors do not best explain why some remedies
have been tossed out or eroded substantially while others have been renewed
or withstood challenge. It turns out that the durability of a remedy depends
far more on the way key decision makers respond to changed conditions
than on the conditions themselves. In particular, durability hinges on how
such decision makers respond to a landscape that is, to varying degrees,
much improved, but in which troubling problems nevertheless persist.
This Article examines the responses of two such decision makers. It
shows that the U.S. Congress and the Supreme Court of the United States
have responded quite differently to changed conditions when they evaluate
longstanding remedies. And yet, I argue, their varied responses share a
common flaw.
For its part, Congress has generally responded to change by staying the
course. It has voted repeatedly to extend remedies beyond expiration dates
and to restore those weakened by judicial interpretation. This stance suggests the view that improved conditions are dependent on a remedy's
continued operation, and that persistent areas of deficiency are best addressed by maintaining existing remedies.
The Supreme Court, by contrast, has been more inclined to view change
as cause to terminate a remedy. The Court has repeatedly pushed for closure
by tying the termination of existing remedies to relatively weak or muddy
criteria, or by relentlessly scaling back the remedy in sequential moves.
Defending this stance, the Justices have argued that intervening factors fuel
persisting problems and that the discrimination under remedy is no longer
the reason these problems endure.
These very different responses to changed conditions share a defining
characteristic. They confront the altered landscape as if it were an on/off

1.

See infra Sections I.A-C.

2.

See infra Sections I.B, D, E.
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switch. With few exceptions, both Congress and the Court have treated existing remedies as fixed in structure. Time and again, they have opted
against adapting a remedy to better serve a changed environment, and instead have understood themselves to confront a stark choice: either
terminate the remedy or let it continue, substantively unchanged.4 In other
words, remedies remain fixed until they are terminated.
This result is a serious problem. It has led the Justices to precipitate termination prematurely because the only alternative they see is the status quo.
But improved conditions are rarely as secure and unequivocal as this stance
allows. Evidence may show, for instance, some diminution in racial polarization among voters, or in the racial achievement gap, but such encouraging
trends require cultivation. Cutting short a remedy destabilizes improved
conditions, and forgoes the opportunity to develop practices that might have
6
made and kept them more secure.
No less problematic, however, is Congress's proclivity to retain a remedy unchanged despite changed conditions. For one thing, this course is
constitutionally unsustainable. While some improved conditions are fragile,
the existing remedial regime is even more unstable and the Court is sure to
scrap it in short order if left unchanged.! Resistance might briefly prolong
the project, or select components of it, but staying the course is not a viable
long-term option.
Nor should it be. The conditions that prevailed when most remedies for
racial discrimination were first instituted are, thankfully, no longer dominant. Racial discrimination indisputably persists today,' but it is different in
scale, scope, and tenor from what it once was. So too, the effects of past
3.

See infra Section I.C.

4. The claim here is that the terms of the remedy rarely change, not that the method of
enforcement is necessarily fixed. Cf Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing
Federal Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 754-55 (1992) (describing the flexibility with which
courts twenty years ago handled the enforcement of existing remedial decrees, including sporadic
efforts to modify the terms of such decrees).
5. Premature closure bears some resemblance to what is known as remedial deterrence, in
that it is often motivated primarily by distaste for the remedy at issue. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights
Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 884-85 (1999) (discussing the
concept of remedial deterrence and noting that in some instances "the threat of undesirable remedial
consequences motivat[es] courts to construct ... right[s] in such a way as to avoid those consequences").
6. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J.
87, 112-13 (1999) (describing remedies as being broader than rights and arguing that they "regulat[e] antecedent structures and practices that create the risk of such violations").
7. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. I v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 129 S. Ct. 2504,
2512 (2009) (avoiding constitutional question in challenge to the VRA's constitutionality, but warning that "current burdens ... must be justified by current needs"); see also infra notes 82-102 and
accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008) (finding employee was
terminated because he was black, and because he complained about black coworkers being terminated); United States v. Vulcan Soc'y, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d 77 (E.D.N.Y 2009) (finding that New
York City Fire Department's use of a qualifying exam discriminated against minority candidates on
the basis of race); Consent Order, United States v. S & S Grp., No. 08-CV-4099 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 17,
2009) (enjoining real estate agency from "steering" minorities toward certain areas).
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discrimination undeniably persist today, but these also now differ in type
and intensity from what they once were.9 Failure to recognize these changes
fundamentally distorts and trivializes history. As important, it disserves our
present needs by wasting resources, imposing unnecessary burdens, and
undermining existing achievements.
This Article seeks to map out a better response to changed conditions
than the all-or-nothing options that presently define the debate. The argument put forth here is that longstanding remedies should neither be
terminated nor continued indefinitely, but instead should be adapted to better serve changed circumstances. The Article then proposes one way
existing remedies might be adapted productively.
Part I identifies five ways Congress and the Court have responded to
changed circumstances when called upon to evaluate existing remedies for
racial discrimination. This Part labels these responses expiration, compliance, normalization, repudiation,and attrition, and argues that they share a

common failing. All offer a blunt choice between termination on the one
hand, and continuation on the other. When Congress and the Court respond
in these ways, they do not investigate how they might adapt a remedy to
better address developing circumstances.
Part II calls for a different response. It urges Congress, the Court, and
other key decision makers to respond to changed conditions by adapting
longstanding remedies rather than terminating or maintaining them. Adaptation is not a euphemism for either slow destruction or long-term
maintenance. Decision makers adapting remedies should reduce or eliminate those remedies that no longer address current problems effectively, but
they will also need to expand or reformulate remedial efforts when doing so
is necessary to advance remedial goals.
At the same time, a remedy's goal cannot and should not be to create the
environment that would have existed had discrimination never occurred. Our
culture has been shaped irrevocably by the practice of racial discrimination
and by our varied efforts to address it. No remedy can excise that experience. Instead, decision makers should adapt the remedial project with

9.

See, e.g., NAT'L CENT. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS: 2008

tbls.109 & 293 (2008), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d08/tables/dt08_109.asp?
referrer=list, and http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d08/tables/dtO8_293.asp?referrer-list) (showing, respectively, declining racial gap in high school graduation rate and growing percentage of
professional degrees conferred on minority students); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS BY OFFICE, 1970 To 2002, AND STATE, 2002 tbl.404 (2002), available at http://

www.census.gov/compendialstatab/2010/tables/10s0404.pdf (showing steady increase in black
elected officials since 1970); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION
OF NOVEMBER 2008 tbl.4b (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/

voting/index.html (showing black registration and voting rates almost equal to that of whites). But
see COLLEGE BOARD,

2009 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS: TOTAL GROUP PROFILE REPORT tbl.8

(2009), available at http://professionals.collegeboard.com/profdownload/cbs-2009-national-TOTAL
-GROUP.pdf (showing large gaps in test scores by ethnicity); Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Race,
Region and Vote Choice in the 2008 Election: Implicationsfor the Future of the Voting Rights Act,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1385 (2010) (showing persistence of racial bloc voting, particularly in regions
with a strong history of racial discrimination).
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awareness of the enduring ways past discrimination continues to shape the
contemporary landscape.
Part II offers one proposal for how this might be accomplished. It urges
a shift in remedial focus away from the effects of past discrimination to the
local institutions that must deal with those effects most directly. The rampant "constitutional wrong[s]" that longstanding remedial measures were
originally created to address no longer inhere in the local institutions subject
to them.'o Work nevertheless remains to be done to ensure that these institutions are not only constitutional, but also that they are constituted in ways
that allow for good governance in an environment shaped by past discrimination and in which some effects endure. Congress, the Court, and other key
decision makers should adapt existing remedies to ensure these institutions
are up to the task. Put differently, a remedy is complete only when the restoration of local control is an informed assumption of responsibility in light of
adversity and not just a devolution of power."
A final word by way of introduction. This Article defines a remedy for
past racial discrimination in expansive terms. It considers traditional judicial
remedies, like school desegregation decrees, imposed, crafted, and enforced
by courts to address specific, adjudicated misconduct, 2 and the federal oversight Congress mandated in Section 5 of the VRA to address pervasive,
regionally based, race-based disenfranchisement. 3 The discussion, however,
also considers provisions of federal voting rights and employment law that
bar state and local officials from actions that produce racially disparate impacts,14 as well as affirmative action plans voluntarily adopted to promote
diversity in higher education and other venues."
These measures, of course, vary considerably. Some are more closely
tied to past discrimination than others; some designate explicit time limits
while others rely on periodic oversight or implicit sunsets; and some employ
more overt racial criteria than others. A premise of this Article is that these

10. See OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 11 (1978) (describing the structural
injunction as a remedial device designed to "reorganiz[e] an institution" based on the idea that "[tlhe
constitutional wrong is the structure itself').
See infra notes 143-156 and accompanying text; cf Freeman v. Pitts, 50 U.S. 467, 490
11.
(1992) ("Where control lies, so too does responsibility.").
12.

See infra note 34.

13.

42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006).

14. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131
(1982) (amended 2006); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (construing Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1965 to prohibit activity with a racially disparate impact); see also
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the "'remedial'
race-based actions" Title VII's disparate impact provisions "affirmatively require[]").
15. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)
(holding the use of racial classifications in a school district's student assignment plan unconstitutional);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding affirmative action plan adopted by the University
of Michigan Law School); BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DisnucT, STUDENT ASSIGNMENT
PLAN/POLICY (2004), available at http://www.berkeley.net/index.php?page=student-assignment-plan
(describing the race-conscious student-assignment system used in the Berkeley Unified School District).
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differences are ones more of degree than kind, and should not mask a common purpose. Rather than discrete efforts operating in separate realms, these
measures are better understood as a cohesive project meant to address the
consequences of the rampant racial discrimination that once defined public
life in America.
Stepping back and examining the remedial project through this wider
lens reveals a common flaw in the way two key institutions have addressed a
crucial and recurring question. Termination and continuation of a remedy
are not the only possible responses to changed conditions. This Article offers an alternative. The endgame requires structure, and its success will
ultimately be measured not by duration alone, but also by the contours of
the path selected.
I. ExISTING RESPONSES
Resisted from their inception, efforts to remedy racial discrimination
have always been controversial. Calls to terminate these efforts are recurrent, and demands to do so are lodged repeatedly with various institutions.
This Part focuses on how two institutions have responded. It culls from remedy-specific tests five distinct ways Congress and the Court have responded
to changed conditions when evaluating challenged remedies.
A. Expiration

Both Congress and the Court have periodically placed expiration dates
on remedial regimes. Such dates tie termination of a remedy to the calendar
rather than to a specific condition addressed by the remedy itself. Reliance
on such dates might accordingly suggest the irrelevancy of changed conditions, apart, of course, from the simple passage of time. Expiration dates
nevertheless offer a means to force a critical evaluation of those changes,
and, in principle at least, the opportunity to adapt an expiring remedy to
them. In practice, however, neither Congress nor the Court has invoked or
relied on expiration dates for this purpose.
For its part, Congress has used expiration dates in the VRA as junctures
to reaffirm but not fundamentally restructure the remedy and to authorize its
continued operation. The Court, by contrast, has suggested that an expiration date should be a nondiscretionary "off switch" triggered solely by the

16. Included among these measures are diversity-based affirmative action policies that proponents defend as nonremedial. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 725; Grutter, 539 U.S. at
337-40. Such polices are considered remedial here based on the view that, absent discrimination,
however remote, race-blind admission criteria or school assignment should have produced the diversity in enrollment such policies sought to promote. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
Home-Grown Racism: Colorado'sHistoric Embrace-And Denial-ofEqual Opportunity in Higher
Education, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 703, 714 n.45 (1999). A similar defense attaches to the disparate
impact tests inhering in Title VII and the VRA, although here the remedial characterization is bolstered by the fact that congressional power to enact the provisions is contingent on it. See City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997).
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passage of time. It has not, however, had the opportunity to put this inclination into practice.
Congress has repeatedly placed statutory expiration dates on critical
provisions of the VRA. Four such dates-1970, 1975, 1982, and 2007'have passed, each one requiring Congress to act affirmatively to keep the
statutory provisions operational. Each time, Congress treated the expiration
date not as a termination point or a point for serious reflection, but instead
as a juncture to affirm existing provisions no one genuinely anticipated
would expire.
At first, the endurance of the VRA reflected the magnitude of the problems the statute targeted. While the VRA swiftly enabled oncedisenfranchised citizens to register and vote "without hindrance,"'8 these
developments quickly exposed other problems that hampered meaningful
participation. Elected officials remained overwhelmingly unresponsive to
minority voters despite a vast increase in minority voter participation.' 9 Minority-preferred candidates made little headway in elections marked by
racial appeals, racially polarized voting, and the use of very large or at-large
electoral districts.20 Racial discrimination in various areas of public life continued unabated. 2 ' Recognizing the severity of these problems, Congress
repeatedly renewed the VRA's temporary provisions.
As it did so, the VRA evolved from an iconic civil rights law into something of a sacred text. The statute's symbolic resonance grew steadily over
time, even as its specific terms remained largely obscure. Belief in the
VRA's salience became so entrenched that by 2006, most members of Congress saw little to gain and much to lose by opposing extension of the
statute.22 They consequently treated the statute's expiration date as reason to
renew the existing remedy 23rather than as cause to terminate or fundamentally restructure the regime.
17. See, e.g., Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973 (2006)) [hereinafter 2006 Reauthorization] (enacted one year prior to actual
expiration date); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973 (2006)) [hereinafter 1982 Reauthorization]; Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971-1973 (2006)) [hereinafter 1975 Reauthorization]; Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§1971-1973 (2006)) [hereinafter 1970 Reauthorization].
18. See City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 84 (1980) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
19. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 45 (1986) (citing S. REP. No. 97-417, at 29 (1982)).
20.

Id. at 47-48.

21.

See, e.g., S. REP. No. 97-417, at 14 (1982).

22. But see Carl Hulse, Rebellion Stalls Extension of Voting Act, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2006,
at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/22/washington/22vote.html?scp=1&sq=&st
=nyt (noting that only a few House members did not support the bill).
23. For their part, the members of Congress who sought termination emphasized not the
calendar but instead contemporary conditions they argued no longer justified the statutory regime.
See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H5180 (daily ed. July 13, 2006) (statement of Rep. Norwood); Richard H.
Pildes, Political Avoidance, Constitutional Theory, and the VRA, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 148
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The Supreme Court, by contrast, has seemed more inclined to view an
expiration date as a nondiscretionary termination point. Seven years ago, the
Court endorsed an expiration date for an admissions ,rogram at the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter v. Bollinger upheld a program in
which race operated not as a hard quota but instead as a "plus" factor meant
to enroll a "critical mass" of minority students at the law school. Writing for
a divided Court, Justice O'Connor held that the law school's program employed a "narrowly tailored use of race" necessary "to further a compelling
interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student
body."a Justice O'Connor, however, made clear that the program's validity
depended on its temporary status. Insisting that the admission policy "must
be limited in time," Justice O'Connor set forth the Court's "expect[ation]
that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today."26
Justice O'Connor did not elaborate, and by presenting the expiration
date as an expectation rather than a firm requirement, she may have simply
meant to allow some flexibility in Grutter'sapplication. In other words, Justice O'Connor may have hoped the law school's program would be obsolete
by 2028, but she nevertheless recognized that an examination of conditions
21
at that time might show that the program remain necessary even then.
Read most strongly, however, Grutter suggests an intent to preclude
such an outcome-oriented inquiry. Justice O'Connor insisted that the admissions program "must be limited in time," and tied that limitation not to a
particular observable condition but instead to an extrinsic, outcomeindependent criterion. On this reading, the Court should hold the admissions
policy obsolete in 2028 as a matter of law, even if nothing changes on the
ground apart from the passage of time.
Grutter was widely read this way,2 and much of the criticism the decision generated took aim at this reading. Opponents of affirmative action saw
no reason to wait a quarter century before scrapping a program that they
29
thought was presently misguided and unconstitutional. Supporters of the
(2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/12/10/pildes.html. The complaint that the decision to reauthorize the VRA was mechanical and nondeliberative might have been lodged with equal force had
Congress terminated the VRA based solely on the expiration date.
24.

539 U.S. 306 (2003).

25.

Id. at 343.

26.

Id. at 342-43.

27. See, e.g., Boyce F. Martin Jr., Fifty Years Later,It's Time to Mend Brown's Broken Promise, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1203, 1219 (arguing the twenty-five year window was not meant to
constitute a firm expiration date).
28. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Comment, Admissions Rituals as PoliticalActs: Guardiansat the
Gates of our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARv. L. REV. 113, 201 (2003) (arguing O'Connor's "expectation" constituted a warning to universities that if their affirmative action programs remained
unchanged in twenty-five years they would be invalidated); Sheryl G. Snyder, A Comment on the
Litigation Strategy, Judicial Politics and Political Context which Produced Grutter and Gratz, 92
KY. L.J. 241, 260 (2004) (interpreting the twenty-five years as a firm expiration date).
29. E.g., Grutter,539 U.S. at 386 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id at 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 350 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Richard H. Sander, A Systematic Analysis of
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law school's admissions policy thought the expiration date ill-advisedly
mandated closure long before the policy's goals could be realized. 30 Opponents and supporters alike deemed the expiration date capricious, being
responsive neither to the policy's substance nor to its objectives. The expiration date seemed to bear no relation at all to the questions that seemed so
pressing.
But that may have been its primary appeal. The Court may have embraced an expiration date in Grutter precisely because doing so could avoid
a messy inquiry into ambiguous conditions on the ground and the need to
engage with the merits of the policy itself. It nominally calls for neither expertise nor politics in its application. Look at the calendar and be done.
We do not know whether the Court ultimately would have done so, opting to treat Grutter's expiration date as a nondiscretionary termination
point.32 Even if the Court's decision in Grutterproves to be durable, the affirmative action plan it upheld was not. Voters in Michigan eliminated the
law school's admissions policy long before Grutter's expiration date came
33
to pass.
B. Compliance

At times, both Congress and the Court have responded to changed conditions by designating specified changes as criteria for termination. Both
institutions have demanded a remedy's termination when compliance with
the criteria is shown and continuation of the existing remedy when it is not.
The Court has opted for weak criteria that are easily satisfied, and hence
remedies have been terminated. Congress has relied on more rigorous conditions with which compliance has proven costly and thus remedies have
endured. Both institutions treat compliance as an "off switch," albeit one
that switches off at dramatically differently rates.
The modem Court, for example, selected easy-to-meet criteria to govern
the dissolution of school desegregation decrees. Back in the early 1990s,
hundreds of public school districts operated under such decrees, some

Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REv. 367 (2004) (arguing that raceconscious affirmative action policies do more harm than good to black law students and lawyers).
30. E.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Inaction, 50 How. L.J. 611, 631 (2007) (objecting
to Grutter'sexpiration date "given that racial minorities are unlikely to have secured any meaningful
degree of parity in the allocation of societal resources within that time").
31. See Michael Greve, Terminating School Desegregation Lawsuits, 7 HARV. J.L. & PuB.
PoL'Y 303, 313-14 (1984) (calling on Congress to set a statute of limitations for terminating existing school desegregation lawsuits).
32. Assuming, of course, that Grutteras precedent would have survived that long. See, e.g.,
Martin D. Carcieri, A Reply to the Editors of the Michigan Journal of Race and Law on "Grutter v.
Bollinger and Civil Disobedience", 32 DAYTON L. REv. 47, 53 (2006). But see Lee Epstein et al.,
Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1483, 1538-39 (2007).
33.

See MIcH. CONST. art I, § 26.
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of more recent origin." Calls to
their inception, but most decrees
This changed, however, once the
defined new criteria for termina-

The first, Board of Education v. Dowell, set the general conditions-

namely, that the school board in question "ha[s] complied in good faith with
the desegregation decree since it was entered, and ... [that] the vestiges of
past discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable." 6 Freeman v. Pitts followed, holding that the Dowell criteria might be satisfied
absent the elimination of racially identifiable schools, at least when "resegregation" was the product "not of state action but of private choices.'
Freeman added that satisfaction of the Dowell criteria might be accomplished incrementally and portions of a decree dissolved even as federal
supervision continued over discrete elements."
A third decision, Missouri v. Jenkins, held that "white flight" from urban
districts to surrounding suburbs was not among the vestiges of unconstitutional discrimination that need be addressed to satisfy the criteria for
dissolution. 9 In Jenkins, this meant that a desegregation decree could not
lawfully direct resources to city magnet schools if the reason for doing so
was to make such schools more attractive to suburban students.4 Jenkins
further held that student achievement scores need not reach "national
34. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BECOMING LESS SEPARATE? SCHOOL DESEGREGATION,
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ENFORCEMENT, AND THE PURSUIT OF UNITARY STATUS 22, 35 (2007) [hereinafter BECOMING LESS SEPARATE?]. The terms varied considerably. Some decrees still required
mandatory busing, although far fewer had done so in the 1970s and early 1980s. Id. at 21 (stating
that the Department of Justice ("DOJ") placed lesser reliance on busing as a remedy after 1982); see
also Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 659 F. Supp. 363, 371 (E.D.
Ark. 1987) (providing one example of a court including busing in settlement plan). More reliance
came to be placed on magnet schools, financing orders, and administrative reforms. See, e.g., id. at
370 exhibit A (ordering financing from the state); Smiley v. Blevins, 514 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Tex.
1981) (allowing continuation of magnet school program in lieu of busing); Order Approving Consent Decree, Lee v. Lee Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 963 F. Supp. 1122 (M.D. Ala. 1997), available at http://
www.justice.govicrtledoldocumentsheeor.php (requiring administrative reforms to correct racial
imbalance in special education programs). For more examples, see U.S. Dep't of Justice, Educational Opportunities Section: Race, CIVIL RIGHTS DIvIsIoN, http://www.justice.gov/crt/edo
documents/classlist.php#race (last visited Sept. 12, 2010).
35. See, e.g., BECOMING LESS SEPARATE?, supra note 34, at 22, 36-37 (showing that the
number of open consent orders only decreased from 444 to 430 between 1991 and 2000, but decreased from 430 to 266 between 2000 and 2007, and that 121 of 193, or 62.7%, of districts in the
southeastern U.S. that have been granted unitary status have been unitary since 2000); Challen
Stephens, Feds keep city school on hold, HUNTSVILLE TIMES, Aug. 13, 2009, at 2A (noting another
54 decrees were terminated between 2007 and 2009).
36.

Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991).

37.

Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495 (1992).

38.

Id. at 496.

39.

Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100 (1995) (finding that the district court acted beyond

its authority in seeking to improve the "desegregative attractiveness" of city schools in an attempt to
attract suburban students).
40.

Id.

December 2010]

Engineering the Endgame

359

norms" prior to dissolution of a decree, thereby suggesting that a racial test
score gap, like white flight, was not among the vestiges of discrimination
that needed to be addressed to satisfy the criteria to dissolve a decree.4'
Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins minimized the causal connection between
original de jure segregation, on the one hand, and things like weak test
scores and white flight, on the other. The decisions held that a desegregation
remedy could be complete notwithstanding the persistence of these problems. Indeed, they held that desegregation was complete even as school
districts operated racially identifiable schools-schools where the racial
identification had grown more, rather than less, pronounced over the years
the decree had been in operation.42 In all three cases, the Justices expressed
impatience with the project of desegregation 43 and suspicion that prolonging
the existing endeavor would change little of substance on the ground."
Critics called the Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins criteria misguided and
the withdrawal of federal supervision based on them premature. 5 Prompt
withdrawal was nevertheless what the Court intended. As Jim Ryan has explained, the three decisions "sent the unmistakable message that district
courts should get out of the business of school desegregation and return
school districts to local control."" The message was received. In the years
since the three decisions, federal courts have repeatedly found school

41. Id. at 117 n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("It appears that the low achievement levels were
never properly attributed to any discriminatory actions on the part of the State or of KCMSD, [that
the district court] simply found that the KCMSD's test scores were below national norms in reading
and mathematics, [and that,] [w]ithout more, these statistics are meaningless.").
42. See, e.g., BECOMING LEss SEPARATE?, supra note 34, at 67 tbl.5.7 (showing litigated
school districts becoming less integrated between 1992 and 2005).
43. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 102 (instructing district courts to "bear in mind" that the goal "is not
only 'to remedy the violation' to the extent practicable, but also 'to restore state and local authorities
to the control of a school system that is operating in compliance with the Constitution'") (quoting
Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489); Freeman, 503 U.S. at 505 (noting that desegregation efforts were meant
to be temporary, and that "no one's interest is furthered by subjecting the Nation's educational system to 'judicial tutelage for the indefinite future' ") (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,
249 (1991)).
44. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 495 ("It is beyond the authority and beyond the practical ability of the federal courts to try to counteract these kinds of continuous and massive demographic
shifts.").
See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL
314-18 (1996); Robert L. Carter, Public School Desegregation: A ContemporaryAnalysis, 37 ST. Louis L.J. 885, 885 (1993); Bradley W. Joondeph, Missouri
v. Jenkins and the De Facto Abandonment of Court-Enforced Desegregation,71 WASH. L. REv. 597
(1996); Wendy Parker, The Futureof School Desegregation,94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1157, 1218 (2000);
Susan Poser, Termination of DesegregationDecrees and the Elusive Meaning of Unitary Status, 81
NEB. L. REv. 283, 358 (2002); Mark V. Tushnet, The "We've Done Enough" Theory of School Desegregation, 39 How. L.J. 767, 775 (1996); Bradley W. Joondeph, Note, Killing Brown Softly: The
Subtle Undermining of Effective Desegregation in Freeman v. Pitts, 46 STAN. L. REv. 147, 167
(1993).
45.

OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION

46. James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARv. L. REV. 131,
142-43 (2007); see also Greve, supra note 31, at 305-06 (stating in 1984 that "desegregation suits
are never terminated").
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districts to be in compliance with the Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins criteria
and have accordingly dissolved hundreds of desegregation decrees.47
By contrast, only a handful of jurisdictions have established their compliance with criteria Congress set back in48 1982 to terminate or "bailout"
from the VRA's preclearance requirement. Part of the reason is that technical compliance with the criteria is comparably difficult.49 The bailout
standard employs more criteria than do Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins, and
the criteria Congress selected are more detailed and concrete. Five separate
grounds facially disqualify a locality from release, 0 and several other criteria
are potentially disqualifying." No state in which preclearance operates
statewide is presently able to satisfy these criteria.52

47. See BECOMING LEss SEPARATE?, supra note 34, at 22. Between 1991 and 2009, federal
courts have dissolved at least 236 DOJ-monitored desegregation decrees, see id. at 27 (showing 128
consent decrees terminated between 1991 and 2007, bringing number of monitored consent decrees
down to 266 from 444); Stephens, supra note 35 (showing the DOJ estimate of monitored consent
decrees down to 208, for a total of 236 terminated decrees), and allowed modification of 128 consent decrees between 1995 and 2001 alone, see BECOMING LESS SEPARATE?, supra note 34, at 27
fig.3.3.
48. See, e.g, NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2516 (2009). Prior to 1982, the only way such
places could escape the preclearance obligation was to demonstrate that they should have never been
subjected to the regime in the first instance. Several places had been subjected due to imprecision
with the original trigger, which linked coverage with turnout and registration data, and thus subjected some places to preclearance even though they never employed the discriminatory tests and
devices the statute was targeting. See Ellen D. Katz, CongressionalPower to Extend Preclearance:
A Response to ProfessorKarlan, 44 Hous. L. REv. 33, 56-57 (2007); see also infra notes 67-69 and
accompanying text.
49. E.g., Michael J. Pitts, What Will the Life of Riley v. Kennedy Meanfor Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act?, 68 MD. L. REv. 481, 536-37 (2009); Richard A. Williamson, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Statutory Analysis of the Revised Bailout Provisions, 62 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1, 42 (1984) ("[T]he conditions for termination of coverage have been made so restrictive that
bailout will continue to be impossible for most jurisdictions."). But see J. Gerald Hebert, An Assessment of the Bailout Provisions of the Voting Rights Act, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT
REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006 257, 257 (Ana Henderson ed., 2007).
50. A locality is disqualified from release if it has been found by a federal court to have
violated Section 2 of the VRA; it was a party to a consent decree, settlement, or unfavorable judgment that ended Section 2 litigation; it required the presence of federal registrars or election
observers; it failed to comply with Section 5; or the attorney general interposed an objection (not
overturned by a court) to the state or political subdivision's change to its voting procedures. 42
U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(A)-(E) (2006). See generally Paul F. Hancock & Lora L. Tredway, The Bailout Standardof the Voting Rights Act: An Incentive to End Discrimination, 17 URB. LAw. 379, 380
(1985).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(F) (requiring the state or subdivision to eliminate voting procedures that dilute equal access to the electoral process, to engage in "constructive efforts" to
eliminate intimidation and harassment of minority voters, and to engage in such efforts to expand
voter registration opportunities and to appoint minority election officials); see also Williamson,
supra note 49, at 68. But see Hebert, supra note 49, at 273 (arguing that compliance with the bailout
criteria is less difficult than typically suggested because the DOJ often employs a "common sense"
approach that allows bailout despite minor Section 5 violations); Paul Winke, Why the Preclearance
and Bailout Provisionsof the Voting Rights Act Are Still a ConstitutionallyProportionalRemedy, 28
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 69, 116 n.288 (2003).
52.

See Pitts, supra note 49, at 536; U.S. Dep't of Justice, Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions,

CIVIL RIGHTS DIvIsIoN, http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting/sec-5/covered.php (last visited Sept. 12,

2010) (providing a map indicating which states, counties, and townships are subject to Section 5 of
the VRA).

December 2010]

Engineeringthe Endgame

361

Many smaller jurisdictions are widely thought to be in compliance, but
the showing they must make to demonstrate their compliance is potentially
daunting. To obtain the exemption, a county or similar political unit must
show not only its compliance with the statutory criteria but also the compliance of all subunits of local government located within its borders. Even
when factually possible, making this showing is burdensome when, as is
often the case, many subunits are involved.5 '
The bailout statute, moreover, adds to the task by placing on the covered
jurisdiction the burden of coming forward with evidence demonstrating
compliance. By contrast, the Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins criteria set forth
what needs to be shown, but not who needs to show it. Thus states and private groups have sought the dissolution of desegregation decrees even when
school districts were unwilling to do so,M and the prospect of such actions
has prompted school districts otherwise disinclined to seek dissolution to
pursue it." Covered jurisdictions, by contrast, face no comparable pressure
to pursue bailout. 6 If they are not inclined to seek the exemption, petitions
are not filed.
A recent Supreme Court ruling may prod some additional bailout applications." Still, public officials who might easily show local compliance with

See, e.g., J. Gerald Hebert, Could the Voting Rights Act Use a Bailout?, CAMPAIGN LE(Oct. 5, 2006), http://www.clcblog.org/blog-item-76.html. The few places that
have obtained bailout in recent years were all in Virginia, where overlapping local governments have
not proliferated to the degree they have elsewhere. See, e.g., I EcON. & STATISTICS ADMIN. & U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INDIVIDUAL STATE DESCRIPTIONS: 2002 287 (2005)
(showing Virginia to be 43rd out of the 50 states in number of local governments with 521).
53.

GAL CENTER BLOG

54. See supra note 147 and accompanying text; see also BECOMING LESS SEPARATE?, supra
note 34, at 28 (showing the DOJ has actively sought dissolution of consent decrees since 2000);
Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1157, 1202, 1207 (2000);
Tajuana Cheshier, County requests unitary status, JACKSON SUN, Dec. 13, 2008, at B I (county
brought suit seeking declaratory judgment that school district is unitary, after school board declined
to do so); Tajuana Cheshier, Decades searching for unity, JACKSON SUN, July 15, 2007, at Al
(school board did not initiate application for unitary status, but joined in application after it was
initiated by the DOJ); Walker critics fight his bid to freeze school-case appeal, ARK. DEMOCRATGAZETTE, July 26, 2007 (private parties brought action to block settlement agreement and immediately seek unitary status after school board voted to settle with party seeking partial continuation of
consent decree).
55. See, e.g., Tajuana Cheshier, Many residents give the School Board mediocre mark, JACKSON SUN, Sep. 17, 2007, at Al (showing community displeasure with school board for not seeking
unitary status); Tajuana Chesier, County Requests Unitary Status, JACKSON SUN, Dec. 13, 2008, at
B I (showing district applying for unitary status fourteen months later).
56. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REc. H5198 (daily ed. July 13, 2006) (considering, but rejecting,
proposals requiring the DOJ to actively solicit bailout applications during the 2006 reauthorization
of the VRA).
57.

See, e.g., id. (noting proposals to require the DOJ to solicit bailout applications).

58. The Court recently read the bailout statute to allow political subdivisions within counties
to seek bailout directly. NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2516-17 (2009). Unlike counties, these
smaller units of local govemment need only make the case for their own eligibility, and need not
acquire information from other subunits that may be resistant or otherwise unable to satisfy the
requisite criteria. See, e.g., U.S. Reaches Agreements with Kings Mountain, N.C., and Sandy
Springs, Ga., to Terminate Coveragefrom Preclearanceof the Voting Rights Act, Sept. 22, 2010,
available at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2010/September/10-crt-1067.html; J. Gerald Hebert, Few

362

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 109:349

the bailout criteria often have little interest in doing so. Some see preclearance as an important deterrent against misconduct, one that gives them
political cover to block discriminatory moves that might otherwise be implemented.9 Others fear a political backlash from constituents who might
equate a bailout application with opposition to minority voting rights.
Some hope to secure partisan advantage from federal oversight."' For all,
proving compliance with the statutory criteria is costly not because satisfying the specific criteria is always factually difficult, but because
demonstrating compliance proves to be costly in other ways.
Petitions showing compliance with the bailout criteria have accordingly
been rare and the regime endures even in places eligible to be released from
it. Compliance with the criteria to dissolve school desegregation decrees is
much easier, and petitions for dissolution are eagerly pursued.62 These outcomes diverge dramatically, and yet the criteria used in both contexts share a
common characteristic. They function as an "off switch." Show compliance
and the remedy ends, or fail to make this showing and the remedy continues.
Adaptation based on changed conditions never occurs.
C. Normalization

A third response to changed conditions views improved conditions and
deficient ones alike as cause to persevere with the status quo. This response,
called here normalization, deems such perseverance the best way to tackle
persistent problems and to protect salient improvements.6 Normalization
views the remedial regime as a regulatory one, flatly rejecting the idea that
remedies are exceptional, time-limited devices justified by exigent circumstances. Instead, it views the remedial project as an enduring one, with terms
and conditions capable of lasting indefinitely.
Congress's 2006 decision to reauthorize the VRA's preclearance provision was, in many respects, a move to normalize that regime. Considerable
evidence showed that opportunities for minority political participation in
regions subject to the remedy were much improved both from 1965, when
Congress first enacted the remedy, and 1982, when it had last reauthorized
the statute. Still, various obstacles to full participation persisted and trouLocal Governments Embracing Bailout
http://www.clcblog.org/blog-item-344.html.

Provision,

Aug.

11,

2010,

available at

59. Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and Amend the
Voting Rights Act, 44 Hous. L. REV. 1, 24 (2007).
60. See Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE
L.J. 174, 214 (2007).
61. Id. at 224-29. See generally Ellen D. Katz, Some Governance Issues in AntiDiscriminationLaw (draft on file with author).
62. Cf Chris Kirkham, Civil rights struggle lives on in La.'s public schools, NEW ORLEANS
TIMEs-PICAYUNE, July 29, 2007, at I (stating black community leaders referred to a desegregation
decree as a "sacred document").
63. See, e.g., Pamela Karlan, The Second Reconstruction, the Third Reconstruction, and the
Reconstruction of Voting Rights, The Futures of Elections Scholarship, A Tobin Project/ALI Conference at Duke University.
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bling, albeit no longer blatant, discrepancies remained between the Elaces
subject to preclearance and those that fell outside the statutory regime.
Congress's response to this evidence was to stay the course it first set in
1965. It extended the preclearance requirement for twenty-five more years,
and made sure the regime would operate just as it historically had. A core
argument in favor of this approach posited that opportunities for minority
voters in places subject to preclearance looked as good as they did in
2006-and decidedly did not look any worse--only because the statutory
regime was continuously deterring misconduct. Eliminate the statute as a
deterrent, and that misconduct promised once again to find expression.
Some anecdotal evidence supported this claim," but it was primarily a
predictive judgment that bad stuff would happen if Congress scrapped preclearance. Not everyone, to be sure, was convinced, and Chief Justice
Roberts, among others, expressed some colorful skepticism on this point.
The prediction, however, was a prediction, and as such, was necessarily nonfalsifiable absent repeal. It rested on the idea that preclearance operated less
as a remedy and more as a treatment for a chronic condition. The condition
may be controlled, but ultimately not cured. Call it the legislative equivalent
of Lipitor for life.
This view fueled Congress's commitment to preserve preclearance in its
original form and to maintain its original scope. Congress thus refused to
ease the bailout criteria, which, as noted above, allow places subject to preclearance to escape the obligation by demonstrating their compliance with
specific statutory criteria. Congress enacted these criteria back in 1982,
and by 2006 many places indisputably had come into compliance with
them.6 Even so, very few jurisdictions had, in fact, bailed out.'0

64. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. I v. Mukasey (Mukasey), 573 F. Supp. 2d 221,
247-66 (D.D.C. 2008) (discussing this evidence); Ellen D. Katz, Not Like the South?: Regional
Variation and Political ParticipationThrough the Lens of Section 2, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006, supra note 49, at 183-221.
65. See, e.g., Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 258-59; An Introduction to the Expiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act and Legal Issues Relating to Reauthorization: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 160 (2006) [hereinafter Hearing: Introduction] (written response of Theodore Shaw, Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.);
Motion to Affirm at 17, NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) (No. 08-322).
66.

See Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 264-65.

67. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08-322)
("Well, that's like the old -- you know, it's the elephant whistle. You know, I have this whistle to
keep away the elephants. You know, well, that's silly. Well, there are no elephants, so it must
work."); see also Hearing: Introduction,supra note 65, at 8 (statement of Richard L. Hasen, Professor, Loyola Law School) ("The problem with [the deterrent rationale] is that it would justify
preclearance for an undetermined amount of time into the future.").
68.

See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.

69. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REc. H5198 (2006) (statement of Rep. Westmoreland) ("So today,
hundreds of jurisdictions that are otherwise able to bail out simply are not doing so. . . .").
70. NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2516 (2009) (noting that only seventeen jurisdictions have
bailed out since 1982).

364

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 109:349

Several proposals to facilitate bailout by eligible jurisdictions were presented in the course of the 2006 reauthorization," but they garnered little
72
support and much opposition. It turned out that few people wanted to encourage bailout even by jurisdictions widely recognized to be eligible for
release under the existing criteria. Some fretted that many of these places
still needed federal oversight" while others insisted that the burden preclearance placed on local authority was minimal.74 Underlying these
sentiments was the conviction that the remedial regime should continue as
is.
This aversion to change also propelled Congress's decision to overrule
the result of the Supreme Court's 2003 ruling in Georgia v. Ashcroft." The
case addressed the validity under the VRA of a state districting plan which
"unpacked" several districts in which African American voters had comprised a majority. Pushed through by Georgia Democrats, the plan dispersed
these loyal Democratic voters among several districts and thereby expanded
Democratic influence. Doing so, however, meant that some minority voters
would no longer be able to elect their preferred candidates as they had done
previously from the majority-minority districts the plan demolished.
The Supreme Court's response had been to let Georgia do whatever it
wanted. The Court said the state could choose whether minority voters
should have diffuse influence or instead secured representation, and endorsed a multifactored inquiry that seemed designed to render any degree of
influence sufficient.1 As others have explained, this ruling effectively terminated preclearance as an operational remedy in the redistricting context.

71. See 152 CONG. REc. H5198 (Westmoreland amendment proposing to require annual
determination by the attorney general as to which jurisdictions are eligible for bailout and to inform
such jurisdictions of their eligibility); see also Hearing: Introduction, supra note 65, at 14 (testimony of Samuel Issacharoff, Professor, New York University School of Law); Rick Hasen, Drafting
a ProactiveBailout Measurefor VRA Reauthorization,ELECTION LAW BLOG (May 18, 2006 09:37
AM), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/005655.html.
72. See, e.g., Luci Baines Johnson & Lynda Johnson Robb, Op-Ed, Don't Dismantle the
Voting Rights Act, N.Y. TIMEs, July 7, 2006, at Al7; see also Hebert, supra note 49.
73. See Understandingthe Benefits and Costs of Section 5 Pre-Clearance:Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 9-10 (2006) [hereinafter Hearing:Benefits and Costs]
(testimony of Armand Derfner, Attorney, Derfner, Altman & Wilborn); The Continuing Need for
Section 5 Pre-Clearance:Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 3-4 (2006)
(testimony of Anita Earls, Director of Advocacy, University of North Carolina Law School Center
for Civil Rights); To Examine the Impact and Effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act: HearingBefore
the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5 (2005) (testimony of Jack Kemp, Former Member of Congress, Former Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development, Founder and Chairman, Kemp Partners) ("[Tihe loss of Federal authority to control
voting procedures could enable local governments to easily discriminate against minorit[y] voters.").
74.

See Hearing: Benefits and Costs, supra note 73, at 10 (testimony of Armand Derfner).

75.

539 U.S. 461 (2003).

76. Id at 482-83; see also id. at 491-92 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (expressing skepticism on
Section 5). For criticism, see id. at 493 (Souter, J., dissenting) and Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v.
Ashcroft and the Retrogressionof Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L.J. 21, 31-32 (2004).
77. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 492-94 (Souter, J., dissenting); Brief Amicus Curiae of Georgia
Coalition For The People's Agenda in Support of Appellees at 4-5, Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (No. 02-
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In 2006, Congress responded by restoring the remedy to what it had
been prior to Georgia v. Ashcroft. It eliminated the discretion the Supreme
Court had given the state, and prohibited covered jurisdictions from using
influence, however defined, as a replacement for the secured election of a
preferred representative.
The Georgia litigation left no doubt that much had changed in Georgia
since Congress had last reviewed and reauthorized the preclearance statute.
The challenged districting plan had been crafted by African American representatives in the Georgia legislature-that is, by representatives who had
been elected in numbers sufficiently substantial to play a decisive role in the
state's legislative process.7 This new political environment, while hardly
infallible, was indisputably very different from what had existed previously.
Congress nevertheless concluded that no change evident in the litigation,
or, for that matter, in the large record it amassed in support of preclearance
more generally, warranted changing the preexisting remedial regime in any
meaningful way. Without doubt, conditions had changed, but Congress saw
this altered landscape not as an "off switch" or as cause to adapt the regime,
but rather as reason to stay the course. It accordingly voted overwhelmingly
to reauthorize the regime with its historic contours.
D. Repudiation

A fourth response to change, repudiation, demands the immediate termination of an existing remedy. Repudiation posits that particular remedial
methods impose serious costs that presently outweigh any benefits the remedies produce. While some believe these costs were never justified,
proponents of repudiation more often argue that changed conditions have
transformed once-justified costs into unjustified ones.' Promoting this view,
a number of individual Justices have repeatedly called on the Court to
182); Karlan, supranote 76, at 21-22; see also infra notes 110-111 and accompanying text (discussing Georgia v. Ashcroft as an example of attrition).
78. The vehicle for this security has long been the majority-minority district, or its functional
equivalent, the so-called coalition district, and thus the statutory "fix" sought to prohibit jurisdictions subject to Section 5 from dismantling such districts in the name of purported influence. See
Persily, supra note 60, at 179-92, 217 (discussing legislative history to the Georgia v. Ashcroft "fix"
and suggesting a lack of consensus as to what was intended).
79. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of its
Own Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710 (2004).
80. See Kartan, supra note 76, at 32-33 (arguing that black participation doesn't resolve
concerns).
81. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 567, 505 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing
terms of early desegregation decrees as being "extraordinary in law but not unreasonable in fact,"
"granting the merits of this approach at the time," while pointing out "it is now 25 years later");
Abigail Thernstrom, Redistricting, Race, and the Voting Rights Act, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE ONLINE, Aug. 6, 2010, available at http://www.aei.org/article/101881 (arguing that the
remedial regime set forth in the VRA of 1965 "was an indispensable and beautifully designed response to a profound moral wrong" but that today it "has become a barrier to the political
integration that was its original aim").
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repudiate particular remedial methods, though these calls have yet to garner
majority support.
A commitment to colorblindness is the most common example of repudiation. Several Justices have invoked this commitment and urged the Court
to repudiate race-conscious remedies. Most often, they equate a remedy's
reliance on race-conscious criteria with the invidious discrimination that
prompted the remedy (or ones like it) in the first place. Chief Justice Roberts adopted this stance three years ago when he led the Court to scrap racebased student assignment plans used voluntarily by two school districts as a
means to promote racially balanced schools. Likening the challenged plans
to de jure segregation of the sort outlawed by Brown v. Boardof Education,
the Chief Justice bluntly stated, "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.""
Other Justices have likewise equated the cure with the disease in making
the case for colorblindness," and have buttressed the argument by citing ill
effects they see that follow from reliance on color-conscious criteria." A
majority of the Court, however, has yet to adopt this stance and repudiate
entire remedies based on the colorblindness principle. To be sure, the Justices have disavowed portions of specific remedial efforts, but typically on
far more narrow grounds than the colorblindness principle would require.
Chief Justice Roberts, for example, was able to toss out the raceconscious student assignment plans at issue in Parents Involved, but only
with Justice Kennedy's equivocal concurrence that would have allowed at
least some racially informed decisions to continue. 86 Similarly, Justice Kennedy led the Court to reverse New Haven's decision to scrap a firefighters
exam in light of race-based factors, but the opinion in Ricci v. DeStefano fell
short of embracing the race neutrality urged by Justice Scalia.

82.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

83.

Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).

84. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (saying Title VII's disparate impact provisions "place a racial thumb on the scales, often requiring
employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on (because
of) those racial outcomes," and calling this type of "racial decisionmaking ... discriminatory").
85. Such reliance is said to stigmatize a remedy's purported beneficiaries, see, e.g., Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349-50 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495,
517 (2000), promote damaging stereotypes, see, e.g., United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144,
174 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring), breed corruption, see, e.g., Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2688 (Alito, J.,
concurring); United States v. Brown, 561 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding black elected officials
intentionally manipulated election procedures to dilute white voting strength), and disproportionately burden parties who fall outside the remedy's reach.
86. See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 787 (2007) (Kennedy, J. concurring); see also Michelle
Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REV. 937, 988-89 (2008); Taunya Lovell Banks, Trampling
Whose Rights? Democratic Majority Rule and Racial Minorities:A Response to Chin and Wagner,
43 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 127, 157 (2008); Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court-2007 Term: Foreward: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARv. L. REv. 4, 38 (2008).
87. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2658; id. at 2681-82 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235-39 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642-43 (1993).
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Even the most vocal proponents of colorblindness have shown themselves to be less committed in practice to the principle than their rhetoric
suggests. Neither Chief Justice Roberts nor Justice Alito was willing to sign
on with Justices Scalia and Thomas to repudiate the primary application of
the VRA's race-based disparate impact standard." Indeed, in LULAC v. Perry, the Chief Justice adopted what arguably was the most expansive reading
of the VRA on a core point in contention," even as he lamented this "sordid
business, this divvying us up by race."9
Justices Scalia and Thomas most consistently voice their commitment to
colorblindness, but they nevertheless accepted the proposition that compliance with the VRA's facially race-conscious preclearance regime constituted
a compelling interest that justified overtly race-based district lines. 9' They
said so, to be sure, at a moment when that regime was set to expire. But just
last spring, Justice Scalia (though not Justice Thomas) agreed to leave standing Congress's 2006 decision to extend this regime for an additional twenty92
five years.
Like colorblindness, a commitment to local control has also animated
calls to repudiate particular remedies. Justice Hugo Black, for instance,
thought the VRA's preclearance requirement was invalid from the start because it treated regions subject to requirement as "little more than conquered
provinces." Much more recently, Justice Kennedy invoked a similar refrain
when he suggested the preclearance obligation offended the "sovereign dignity" of subject states,94 and said so seemingly as cause to repudiate the
preclearance regime.
In fact, a majority of the Court recently seemed poised to repudiate the
preclearance regime precisely because the statute selectively displaced local

88. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC v. Perry), 548 U.S. 399, 492
(2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 511-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting
in part) (adhering to position voiced by Justice Thomas in Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994), that
Section 2 of the VRA should not prohibit vote dilution).
89. See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 492, 505-07 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Ellen D. Katz, Reviving the Right to Vote, 68 OHIo ST. L.J. 1163, 1172 (2007); Daniel R.
Ortiz, Cultural Compactness, 105 MICH L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 48 (2006),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/105/ortiz.pdf.
90.

LULAC, 548 U.S. at 511.

91.

Id. at 519 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

92.

NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009); id. at 2519 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

93.
part).

South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 358-60 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting in

94. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 67, at 34; see also 152 CONG. REc. H5180
(daily ed. July 13, 2006) (statement of Rep. Norwood); Charles Babington, GOP Rebellion Stops
Voting Rights Act: Complaints Include BilingualBallots and Scope of Justice Dept. Role in South,
WASHINGTON POsT, June 22, 2006, at A07 ("Rep. Jack Kington (R-Ga.) said . . . . 'If you move a
polling place from the Baptist church to the Methodist church, you've got to go through the Justice
).
Department ....
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control." Ultimately, however, the Justices, save Justice Thomas, passed on
the opportunity to disavow the remedy, and instead issued an obscure statutory holding that left this regime fully operational, at least for the time
being.
Repudiation based on local control arguably gained more traction
among the Justices in the busing disputes of the 1970s, but here, too, the
Court's rulings do not wholly disavow the remedial method." The Court
came closest to repudiation in Milliken v. Bradley, when it barred the busing
of children across district lines as a means to integrate previously segregated
schools." Milliken held that local control took precedence,'" even though so
holding meant that meaningful desegregation would never occur in places
like Detroit where the case arose.o' Milliken hobbled busing as a remedial
technique and thwarted integration as a remedial goal. Still, the decision did
not prohibit busing based on race within municipal boundaries (thus including cities and counties of substantial size), and the practice continued to be
employed in various jurisdictions well after the decision in Milliken was
reached.'02
In sum, the Court has not repudiated entire remedies based on their use
of color-conscious criteria or their displacement of local control.' 03 The Justices who advocate repudiation seek to scrap these core tools of the remedial
project, convinced that the damage they cause outweighs the consequences
that might follow from their elimination. To date, this conviction has failed

95. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Skepticism at the Court on Validity of Vote Law, N.Y. TIMES,
April 30, 2009, at A16; Rick Hasen, NAMUDNO: The Answer to My QuestionAppears to be "Yes",
ELECTION LAW BLOG (Apr. 29, 2009, 08:00 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/2009_04.html.
96. For more on this decision, see infra notes 128-132 and accompanying text (as an example of adaptation).
97. See Ellen D. Katz, Bush v. Gore to NAMUDNO: A Response to ProfessorAmar, 1 FLA.
L. REV. 991, 997 (2009) (explaining what the decision accomplishes).
98.

Most are better seen as examples of attrition. See infra notes 104-107 and accompanying

99.

418 U.S. 717 (1974).

text.
100.

Milliken, 418 U.S. at 752.

101.
See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 296-97
(2002) ("Official, legal segregation indeed was dead [after Milliken]; but what replaced it was a

deeper, more profound segregation . . . . Tens of thousands of black children attend schools that are
all black, schools where they never see a white face; and they live massed in ghettos which are also
entirely black.").
102.

See, e.g., K. FORBIS JORDAN & CHARLES V. DALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., METROPOLI-

TAN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 9-10 (1980), available at http://digital.library.unt.edulgovdocs/crs/
permalink/meta-crs-8148:1.
103. Voters have been more apt to do so. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. ART. I, § 31, amended by Cal.
Proposition 209 (1996); MICH. CONST. ART. 1, § 26(1), amended by Mich. Proposal 06-2 in (2006);
NEB. CONST. ART. I, § 30, amended by Neb. Initiative 424 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE. § 49.60.400
(2010), amended by Washington Initiative 200 (1998); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458
U.S. 457 (1982) (overturning, as a violation of equal protection, a voter initiative that stripped local
school districts of the power to mandate busing). But cf Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular

Intent": Interpretive Dilemmas in DirectDemocracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107 (1995) (explaining difficulties in discerning voter intent from election returns).
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to garner majority support, perhaps because the consequences of repudiation
are feared to be grave or simply because they are unknown. As a result, remedies terminate, but they generally are not repudiated.
E. Attrition

A fifth response to change, attrition, views areas of both improvement
and deficiency as cause to end the remedial project. Attrition operates as an
"off switch," albeit one executed by a steady dimmer. The Supreme Court
frequently uses attrition to slash remedies the Justices dislike, that they believe to be ineffectual, or that they think no longer serve pressing needs.
Attrition scales back existing remedies, leaving them nominally operational
but ultimately diminished to a degree that is indistinguishable from outright
termination.
The Court has repeatedly sheared off core elements of remedial programs. For example, in the school desegregation context, the Court
originally adopted an expansive vision of what desegregation should entail, 'e but beginning in 1974, dramatically cut back the range of methods
that might permissibly be employed. Milliken v. Bradley outlawed interdistrict busing absent evidence pointing to a "significant violation" by all
districts involved, and rejected the notion that desegregation required "any
particular racial balance in each 'school, grade or classroom.'"'" Having
effectively eliminated the prospect of meaningful integration in many urban
areas, the Court soon found itself again attempting to make separate schools
more equal. 07
The Justices have similarly hacked away at remedies in the voting rights
context. After a series of decisions pledged to give the VRA's preclearance
regime "the broadest possible scope,"' 08 the modem Court has steadily (albeit not without exception'") whittled back the regime's reach. It has
systematically lowered the hurdle covered jurisdictions must meet to obtain

104. Voters occasionally do so as well. See, e.g., Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527,
540-42 (1982) (upholding Proposition I, which barred state courts from enacting busing remedies
when federal courts would not be permitted to do so under the federal Constitution).
105. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (holding interdistrict busing is a permissible
means to integrate schools where multiple school districts engaged in de jure segregation); id. at 15
(stating that the goal of desegregation efforts is to eliminate racially identifiable schools); Green v.
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
106.

Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 740-45 (1974).

107. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); see also James E. Ryan, Schools, Race,
and Money, 109 YALE L. 249, 261-62 (1999); Paul R. Dimond, Panel II: Concluding Remarks, 61
FORDHAM L. REv. 63, 63 (1992) ("In its own way, Milliken can best be understood as a 'separate but
equal' result for our times.").
108.
109.
(1996).

Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1969).
See, e.g., Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S. 273 (1997); Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 519 U.S. 9
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preclearance,"o a practice that has ensured that most electoral changes will
pass review."' The Court has also reduced the types of electoral changes that
must be precleared."2 Along the way, the Justices have lamented the regime's reliance on race-conscious criteria,"'3 its selective displacement of
local control," 4 its seeming absence of limiting principles,"' and its insensitivity to improved conditions.
So, too, the Court has cut back the reach of Section 2 of the VRA, a remedial provision barring electoral practices that produce racially disparate
results. A divided Court initially construed Section 2 expansively,"' but subsequent decisions have steadily narrowed the remedy. These decisions do so
primarily by exempting certain types of electoral structures from Section 2's
proscription, even when the structures facially place distinct burdens on minority voters." 8
A recent example is Bartlett v. Strickland,"9 in which the Court held that

Section 2 offers no protection to minority voters who are too few in number
to comprise the majority of a single-member district. On the facts of Bartlett, drawing district boundaries in some locations but not others would have
110. See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (holding that covered jurisdictions
may select electoral structures that reduce or eliminate the power of minority voters to elect candidates of choice so long as efforts were made to provide such voters diffuse influence in the electoral
process); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000) (holding that preclearance of electoral changes is permissible even if enacted with invidious intent, so long as the intent does not
make conditions far worse than they had been); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471
(1997) (holding that violations of Section 2 of the VRA are not cause to deny preclearance); Beer v.
United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976) (holding that preclearance is to be denied only when proposed
electoral changes worsen, or cause "retrogression" to, opportunities for minority political participation).
111.

See Pitts, supra note 49, at 523; The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Leading Cases, 117

HARv. L. REv. 226, 478 (2003).

112. See Riley v. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 1970 (2008); Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm'n, 502
U.S. 491 (1992). But see Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., Cal., 519 U.S. 9 (1996).
113.

See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1244-45 (2009).

114. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 67, at 34 (voicing skepticism about the
VRA's regional burdens and Congress's "finding that the sovereignty of Georgia is less than the
sovereign dignity of Ohio. The sovereignty of Alabama ... is less than the sovereign dignity of
Michigan. And the governments in one are to be trusted less than the governments [of] the other").
115.

See, e.g., Presley, 502 U.S. at 505-06.

116. See Riley, 128 S. Ct. at 1987 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Voting practices in Alabama
today are vastly different from those that prevailed prior to the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of
1965.").
117.

See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

118. See Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1248 (holding that Section 2 does not mandate the preservation
of "crossover districts," wherein minority voters can elect preferred candidates with the help of nonminority voters who "cross over" and vote for the minorities' preferred candidate); LULAC v. Perry,
548 U.S. 399, 445-46 (2006) (holding that Rep. Martin Frost, a white candidate whom black voters
had supported regularly for twenty years, did not qualify as a minority "candidate of choice" under
Section 2); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011, 1022 (1994) (finding that satisfaction of
"Gingles factors" is necessary but not sufficient to show a violation of Section 2, and that Section 2
does not require maximizing the number of majority-minority districts); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S.
874, 885 (1994) (holding the size of a governing body is not subject to Section 2 challenge).
119.

129 S. Ct. 1231.
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allowed minority voters to form cross-racial coalitions and elect representatives of their choice. Bartlett made clear that the VRA did not require that
such lines be drawn--even though it would require specified boundaries had
20
the minority voters been able to claim majority status in a single district.'
Bartlett highlights how scaling back a remedy may produce perverse effects. Bartlett rejected an expansive statutory construction that would have
unquestionably enlarged the statute's reach by making more conduct subject
to challenge under Section 2. The discomfort and distaste with which many
of the Justices viewed the race consciousness that inheres in Section 2's disparate impact test all but ensured a majority of the Court would vote against
expansion.121 By so doing, however, the Justices cut off an application of the
statute that promised to encourage the type of political participation the
Court has long claimed it wants to promote-namely, the type that yields
cross-racial coalitions.122 At the same time, the Justices restricted the statute's reach to protect the type of participation they most dislike-namely,
that secured by the majority-minority district. 123 The result is a circumscribed remedy, but not one crafted to further the goals the Court has
deemed most worth pursuing.
Finally, in the employment context, the Court has cut back Title VII's
remedial reach. Ricci v. DeStefano famously involved a decision by the City
of New Haven to scrap test results after no African American firefighters
scored high enough to secure promotions under applicable rules. The City
argued that Title VII compelled this result given the test's racially disparate
impact and the city's belief that high scores on the test were not a necessary
job requirement.124 Five Justices, however, held that federal law did not require the city to throw out the test.
Ricci held that Title VII's proscription against disparate impact was inapplicable to a context in which many informed observers viewed such

Id. at 1246-47.
121. See id. at 1249 ("It would be an irony, however, if § 2 were interpreted to entrench racial
differences by expanding a 'statute meant to hasten the waning of racism in American politics.'"
(quoting De Grandy, 512 U.S at 1020)). For a discussion of the race consciousness that inheres in
the VRA's disparate impact test, see Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 75-79
(2000).
122. See, e.g., De Grandy, 512 U.S at 1020 ("[M]inority voters are not immune from the
obligation to pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground, the virtue of which is not to be
slighted in applying a statute meant to hasten the waning of racism in American politics."); see also
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 480 (2003) (allowing state to disperse rather than concentrate
minority voters).
120.

123. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1246-47; see also Rick Hasen, Cross-over Districts and the Shaw
Claims, ELECTION LAW BLOG (Mar. 13, 2009 11:47 AM), http://electionlawblog.orglarchives/
013187.html (suggesting that the requirement of majority-minority districts might lead to invalidation of Section 2); Rick Hasen, Initial Thoughts on Bartland v. Strickland: Narrowing the Voting
Rights Act to Save it?, ELECTION LAw BLOG (Mar. 9, 2009 09:03 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/
archives/013149.html (arguing that the decision's limitations on the Act might spare it from a facial
overturn).

124.

Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2659, 2674-75 (2009).
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application unexceptional, albeit hardly unproblematic.'2 As such, Ricci
highlights a more general problem regarding remedial enforcement in a
changed landscape. As conditions change, standard applications of remedial
regimes may indeed become problematic, because longstanding remedies
have become either ill-suited to contemporary concerns or simply too costly
to maintain in light of the altered landscape. Whether Ricci was such a case,
the dispute was poorly served by the on/off framework with which the Justices confront remedial regimes. Just how far Ricci narrowed Title VII will
depend on later cases, but the decision is plausibly read to have scrapped
one of its core applications. Insofar as the prohibition on disparate impact
no longer provides an operational constraint in the employment arena,126
Ricci will have terminated the remedy without explicitly saying so. The decision accordingly shows how the Court uses attrition as an opaque method
of termination.
II. AN

ALTERNATIVE: ADAPTATION

We need to respond more effectively to changed conditions. We should
adapt remedies as conditions change and vigorously resist both termination
and indefinite extension as the preferred course of action. This Part offers
some modest steps that might foster adaptation, and points out some of the
institutional concerns raised by its pursuit. It then offers one substantive
proposal for how remedies might be adapted productively.
A. Promoting Change

Remedies are typically evaluated in complex circumstances. Improved
conditions may be simultaneously dramatic and fragile; and serious, if perhaps less overt, problems are likely to persist. These conditions are ill-served
when the available options are limited to termination, on the one hand, and
continuation of an existing remedy originally designed for different conditions, on the other. Most often, adaptation is the better response.127
125. See, e.g., Melissa Hart, ProceduralExtremism: The Supreme Court's 2008-2009 Labor
and Employment Cases, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. Pot'Y J. 253, 256-57 (2009) (noting that the Supreme
Court announced a new interpretation of Title VII in Ricci, and it was unusual for the Court to not
remand the case to the lower court for reconsideration under the new rule); Richard Primus, The
Future ofDisparateImpact, 108 MIcH. L. REV. 1341, 1343 (2010); see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 530
F.3d 88, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2008) (Carbanes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the case might present an issue
of first impression, and expressing concern at applying Title VII in a manner that would require the
fire department to discard the results of a test designed to be race-neutral); New Supreme Court
ruling rocks your Title VII world, MICH. EMP. L. LETTER, Aug. 2009 (stating that Ricci creates a new
Title VII standard).
126.

See Primus, supra note 125.

127. But, of course, not always. A demand to terminate a remedy immediately after it issues is
almost certainly premature and standing alone insufficient cause to restructure the remedy's terms.
Cf Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Board, 444 F.2d 1440, 1401 (5th Cir. 1971) (disputing school
district's claim it was "unitary" after operating one semester under an approved decree, noting
"[olne swallow does not make spring"). So, too, changes separate from the mere passage of time
may establish that a remedy has accomplished its mission and thus should terminate.

December 2010]

Engineering the Endgame

373

Proposals to adapt specific remedies nevertheless rarely gain traction.
Key decision makers like Congress and the Court repeatedly define their
options too narrowly and thus fail to pursue adaptation seriously. This failing is a systematic problem. It propels the termination of remedial decrees
in the school desegregation context, the steady erosion of disparate impact
in the voting and employment realms, and the stolid maintenance of the
VRA's preclearance regime in the voting arena. A single binary framework
drives these divergent responses to changed conditions.
In an ever-changing environment, decisions to stay the course or terminate a remedy should be met with deep skepticism. In internal deliberations
and public discussions alike, such decisions should trigger something functionally akin to the heightened scrutiny courts apply when decisions
implicate suspect traits or infringe on fundamental rights. Such scrutiny
would help ensure that these decisions are supported by good cause rather
than conclusory judgments or simply path dependence.
Good cause, moreover, should be proved and not simply asserted. More
specifically, the subsidiary claims typically used to bolster decisions either
to terminate remedies or retain them unchanged should be scrutinized more
rigorously than they have been and, where possible, tested empirically.
Claims that existing remedies are burdensome to administer, stigmatizing to
their beneficiaries, and a source of polarization in the affected communities
might accurately describe current conditions or they might simply be empty
assertions. Similarly ambiguous are the recurring claims that existing remedies deter misconduct and that improved conditions are dependent on their
continued operation. All these claims should be substantiated, and rigorous;
empirical study should be demanded.
Decision makers should demand data of this sort when they evaluate existing remedies in light of changed conditions. Demanding information, of
course, does not alone ensure that the data produced will be reliable or that
it will be carefully scrutinized. Nor does it mean that decision makers will
no longer opt to terminate or continue remedies in their existing forms. A
presumption in favor of adaptation nevertheless begins to shift the debate by
demanding more substantiation for and scrutiny of decisions to terminate or
to stay the course.
Decision makers will vary in their institutional capacity to adapt remedies in response to such information. Recently, for instance, the Supreme
Court adapted the VRA's preclearance regime in a manner Congress might
have enacted without question or legal controversy, and, indeed, to potentially productive effect. For the Court to make this change, however, was
simply lawless.
In NAMUDNO, the Court ruled that the plaintiff was eligible to seek bailout even though the VRA facially excluded entities like it from petitioning
for the exemption. The statute allowed "political subdivision[s]" to petition
for bailout but defined such subdivisions as either a county or a state subdivision "which conducts registration for voting" when the county does not.128
128.

42 U.S.C.

§ 19731(c)(2)

(2006).

374

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 109:349

The NAMUDNO plaintiff was neither. As a result, the Court's unanimous
conclusion that the plaintiff was nevertheless eligible for the exemption required a statutory construction that Rick Hasen pointed out "virtually no
lawyer thought was plausible." 29
Interestingly, Chief Justice Roberts seemed well aware of this. He acknowledged that the holding required the Court to take an "unusual" step
and ignore an explicit statutory definition, and that circumstances existed in
which the district court's contrary holding of ineligibility "might well be
correct."" The Chief Justice did not bother to address either the legislative
history or a Justice Department regulation that directly contradicted what
the Court read the 1982 VRA amendments to have accomplished."' Instead,
Chief Justice Roberts anemically posited that "[i]t is unlikely" Congress
intended for the bailout provision to have an effect that was, in fact, welldocumented and universally understood when Congress reauthorized the
statute in 2006.32
Animating the ruling was the Court's belief that Congress had been insufficiently responsive to improved conditions in covered jurisdictions when
it opted to extend the existing remedial regime for another quarter century.
The opinion avoids striking down the remedy, but makes clear how the Justices viewed the constitutional question presented. The decision all but
guarantees the Court will scrap the remedy in the next case unless something significant about the statutory regime changes by then.'
The decision was widely praised because it kept the preclearance regime
operational, at least for now. But the manner in which the Court accomplished this is nevertheless a deeply problematic instance of judicial
overreaching. The Court took it upon itself to initiate some of the change it

129.

Rick Hasen, Initial Thoughts on NAMUDNO: ChiefJustice Roberts Blinked,

ELECTION

LAW BLOG (June 22, 2009, 08:00 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013903.html.

130.

129 S. Ct. at 2514.

131. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 97-417, at 57 n.192 (1982) ("Towns and cities within counties may
not bailout separately."); Judicial Administration, 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.2, 51.5 (2008); H.R. REP. No. 97227, at 2 (1981) ("The standard for bail-out is broadened to permit political subdivisions, as defined
in Section 14(c) (2), in covered states to seek to bail out although the state itself may remain covered."); Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as
Amended, 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.2, 51.5 (2009) (DOJ regulations); Revision of Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 Fed. Reg. 486 (Jan. 6, 1987)
(providing commentary for changes to C.F.R.).
132.

NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2516; see also supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text.

133. NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2511-12 (citations omitted) (noting the "substantial 'federalism costs"' Section 5 exacts, its broad application to all electoral changes "however innocuous," the
fact that "[t]hings have changed in the South," that the racial gap in voter registration and turnout
rates is diminished and in places nonexistent, that minority candidates hold elected office "at unprecedented levels," that "[b]latantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare," the dated
character of the coverage formula's weak relation to current conditions, and the fact that the distinct
burdens imposed on covered jurisdictions "may no longer" be warranted).
134. See Katz, supra note 97, at 998; see also Ellen D. Katz, Opinion, Voting Rights Act § 5:
Leave it up to Congress, NAT'L L.J. Apr. 13, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/
PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202429774549&slretum=1&hbxlogin=1 (arguing that the Court should find
a way to force congressional reconsideration).
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believed was needed. The change it made may, in substance, prove to be
productive,"' but the ruling is not a credible act of statutory construction.
The alternative, moreover, need not have been to toss out the remedy entirely. Given the statutory language, the Court would have done better to
explore ways to encourage congressional reconsideration of the remedy than
to make the change to the statute itself.
But while NAMUDNO stands as a blatant example of judicial overreaching, the Court is hardly without power to adapt remedies through the
reasonable exercise of judicial review. As discussed below, the terms governing remedial regimes typically allow the Court itself ample leeway to
adapt remedies productively. The VRA's preclearance regime, in fact, is not
an exception. Instead, the specific dispute in NAMUDNO made it a poor
candidate for judicial adaptation, at least in the manner selected by the
Court.
B. Adapting Institutions

Adaptation requires more than simply the inclination to pursue change.
It requires substantive commitments to direct the nature of the change to be
implemented. This Section proposes one such commitment: that decision
makers like Congress and the Court shift the remedial focus away from the
effects of past discrimination to the institutions that must deal most closely
with them. The goal should be the development of robust local institutions
capable of productively handling the vestiges of discrimination that persists.
For example, the racial test-score gap among elementary and secondary
school students has long been understood as a vestige of past discrimination
in schools, and for years, school desegregation decrees have directed resources towards eliminating it. Standing alone, however, the test-score gap
is not the best gauge of a school that best serves minority students. Recent
135. The ruling vastly increases the number of jurisdictions eligible to apply for bailout, and
makes successful bailout applications more likely, given that the newly eligible jurisdictions have no
political subunits for which they must account. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. It remains
to be seen whether the change will meaningfully alter the way preclearance operates. See supra
notes 48-53 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing
reluctance of covered jurisdictions to petition for bailout even when eligible). Still, encouraging
more bailout applications is a good idea. It holds promise as a means to channel resources to those
places that most need them, while reducing the administrative burdens in places that no longer require oversight.
136. See Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Achieving Equality of EducationalOpportunity in the Wake
of JudicialRetreat From Race Sensitive Remedies: Lessonsfrom North Carolina,52 AM. U. L. REv.
1477, 1482 n.9 (2003); see also Larry V. Hedges & Amy Nowell, Changes in the Black-White Gap
in Achievement Test Scores, 72 Soc. EDUC. 111, 111 (1999); cf David Armor et al., The Outlookfor
School Desegregation,in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 323 (Christine Rossell et
al. eds., 2002).
137. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1977) (directing resources to address racial achievement gaps); Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 E Supp. 19, 24-26 (W.D. Mo. 1985),
decree terminated, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (mandating various programs designed to improve student
achievement); Tasby v. Wright, 520 E Supp. 683, 741-43 (N.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd in part, 713 F2d
90 (5th Cir. 1983) (ordering increased resources to lower teacher-student ratio and thereby improve
minority student achievement).
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experience with the No Child Left Behind Act ("NCLB") 3" suggests that
some schools reporting gaps, and what NCLB deems insufficient "adequate
yearly progress," are in fact well-functioning, sound institutions that are
tackling complex educational issues with expertise and sophistication.'"
Other schools that report better test scores and seemingly better yearly progress often operate less-rigorous and exacting programs that remain
deficient in important respects.'
This disconnect between good schools on the one hand and the racial
test-score gap on the other suggests that termination of a remedial desegregation decree need not be contingent on eliminating the gap. The problem
with a ruling like the Supreme Court's 1995 decision Missouri v. Jenkins is
not that it allowed dissolution despite the gap's persistence.141 The problem
instead is that the Court never inquired whether the school district had been
adequately equipped to address the gap on an ongoing basis.142 The Justices
never explored what resources the district might need to perform this task in
the absence of federal supervision, and thus never demanded that the district
have these resources. Instead, Jenkins simply demanded an end to federal
supervision.
Jenkins was not alone in lacking this institutional focus. Congress and
the Court have consistently failed to place significant value on the development of robust local institutions when they evaluate longstanding remedies.
The VRA's bailout criteria come closest to valuing such development, but
even these criteria do so only minimally.143
138.

See Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).

139. See, e.g., Charles A. McCullough, II, What Matters Even More: Codifying the Public
Purpose of Education to Meet the Education Reform Challenges of the New Millennium, 27 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 45, 50 n.19 (2007); see also Press Release, Hoover Institution, NCLB Does a
Poor Job of Distinguishing Good Schools From Ineffective Ones (Sept. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.hoover.org/pubaffairs/releases/4269286.htmi (showing that NCLB lacks a growth metric
to account for improving schools that still are not meeting AYP levels).
140. James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 932, 944-48 (2004); Chester E. Finn, Dumbing Education Down, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2007, at
A16 (showing states lowering their standards to comply with NCLB); see also Evan Stephenson,
Evading the No Child Left Behind Act: State Strategies and Federal Complicity, 2006 BYU EDuc.
& LJ. 157, 173 (2006); cf Sam Dillon, Obama Calls for Major Changes in Education Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2010, at Al.
141.

515 U.S. 70, 98-103 (1995).

142. For a discussion of other problems with the decision, see id. at 153-54 (Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that test scores, while below the national average, showed improvement, and
that further improvement approaching the national average could reasonably be expected with limited continuation of the desegregation remedies); id. at 176 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (identifying
the goal of attracting more nonminority students to the Kansas City, Missouri school district); Tushnet, supra note 45.
143.
Bailout glances at institution-building by placing the burden on local entities to make
the case for their release from preclearance, see supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text, and by
requiring that jurisdictions make "constructive efforts" to encourage minority participation, see 42
U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(F) (2006). Still, this latter requirement functions more as a marker of good
faith than as a means to develop healthy institutional structures. See generally Hebert, supra note 49.
The bailout criteria, moreover, disqualify jurisdictions from bailout if they have been party to a
voting rights consent decree in the last decade, even though participation in such a decree might
foster the very type of institutional growth upon which a successful bailout petition should ideally
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The lack of focus on institution building is cause for concern. Existing
remedies were first imposed because local institutions had malfunctioned so
severely that simply prohibiting discriminatory conduct was seen as a necessary but insufficient response.'" Remedies accordingly imposed affirmative
measures for local institutions to implement under supervision. 14 The expectation was that supervision would ultimately resolve the institutional
incapacity that gave rise to the remedies in the first instance. Years later,
however, decision makers evaluate and either terminate or extend remedies
without adequately investigating whether the institutional issues that
prompted their creation had been or are being adequately addressed.
Compounding this problem is the fact that local institutions operating
under a remedial regime often become accustomed to outside oversight, and,
at times, prefer the oversight to governing without it. Supporters of the
VRA's 2006 reauthorization, for example, included several jurisdictions who
were themselves subject to the preclearance obligation.'4 Similarly, a select
number of school districts have opposed efforts to dissolve governing desegregation decreesl 47 and local governments have pressed expansive views of
depend. For examples of consent decrees, see Consent Decree, United States v. Brown, 494 F. Supp.
2d 440 (S.D. Miss. 2007) (No. 4:05CV 33TSL-AGN), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/
voting/sec_2/noxubee_cd.pdf; Consent Decree, United States v. Crockett County, Tenn., No. 1-011129 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 17, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting/litigation/crockett
cd.pdf; see also U.S. Dep't of Justice, Cases Raising Claims Under Section Two of the Voting Rights
Act, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting///sec 2/recent.php (last
visited Sept. 12, 2010).
144. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 366 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("The [VRA] contains no reservation in favor of customary abridgment
grown familiar after years of relentless discrimination, and the preclearance requirement was not
enacted to authorize covered jurisdictions to pour old poison into new bottles."); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966) ("Congress had found that case-by-case litigation was inadequate to combat widespread and persistent discrimination in voting . . . [and a]fter enduring nearly a
century of systematic resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment, [it] might well decide to shift the
advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims.").
145.

See, e.g., H.R. REP. 91-397, at 1 (1969).

146. See, e.g., Brief for the States of North Carolina, Arizona, California, Louisiana, Mississippi, and New York as Amici Curiae in Support of Eric H. Holder, Jr., et al. at 2, NAMUDNO, 129
S. Ct. 2504 (2009) (No. 08-322) ("The preclearance requirements of Section 5 do not impose undue
costs on covered jurisdictions."); id. at I ("The Amici States recognize that Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act has allowed our Nation to make substantial progress toward eliminating voting discrimination. More, however, remains to be done."); see also Reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act's
Temporary Provisions: Policy Practicesand Views from the Field: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On
the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Prop. Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11
(2006) (statement of Donald Wright, Gen. Counsel, North Carolina State Board of Elections) ("It
has been my experience from the beginning that, I have never had any difficulty getting expedited
pre-clearance or any reasonable cooperation from the U.S. Department of Justice."). But see Brief of
Amicus Curiae Georgia Governor Sonny Perdue in Support of Appellant, NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct.
2504 (No. 08-322); Brief of the Honorable Bob Riley, Governor of the State of Alabama, as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Neither Party, NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08-322).
147. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 74 (1995) (noting that the school district
served as nominal defendant and cross-claimant); id. at 77-80 (noting that the decree the school
district was defending provided additional funding for renovations and salary expenses); Belk v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. 269 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001) (school district arguing against
unitary status in reverse-discrimination case brought by nonblack student); United States v. Georgia,
702 F. Supp. 1577 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (school district arguing for dismissal without a finding on unitary status, thus effectively retaining the permanent injunction mandating desegregation); Parker,
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federal remedial programs that would have reduced local autonomy had the
Supreme Court not ultimately rejected them.'48
Local officials embrace remedial oversight for varied reasons. Some do
so because they lack the political clout to prevent discrimination absent the
outside backing that undergirds longstanding remedial regimes. Anecdotal
evidence collected by Congress prior to the 2006 VRA reauthorization
showed local officials blocking ostensibly discriminatory moves by invoking
the federal remedy.'49 Similarly, predominantly minority school districts
have found themselves unable to secure an equitable share of state aid unless they are subject to a federal decree requiring such division. 50
Elsewhere, local officials have embraced remedial measures for partisan
gain, blatant self-dealing,"' and outright illegality. 52 In Ricci v. DeStefano,
the "unusual" posture of a city arguing against its own autonomy prompted
Justice Alito to conclude that a mixture of self-dealing, corruption, and pandering led local officials to scrap the disputed employment test. '5 Justice
supra note 45, at 1206-07 (2000) (arguing that school districts rarely request dismissal in school
desegregation cases); Walker criticsfight his bid, supra note 54 (school board voted to settle with a
party seeking partial continuation of desegregation decree, even though city attorney advised that
board would likely be granted unitary status).
148. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674-75 (2009) (rejecting claim pressed
by city officials in New Haven that Title VII required them to scrap an employment exam in which
no African American firefighters had scored high enough to qualify for promotion); Bartlett v.
Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1237-38 (2009) (rejecting claim pressed by state officials that Section 2
of the VRA required them to draw district lines that violated state law).
149. See, e.g., Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 265 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing city attorney blocking local effort to dismantle majority-black district who argued it violated Section 5); Voting Rights
Act: Evidence of Continued Need, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 104, 362 (2006) (Statement of Kent Willis in appendix of
statement of Joe Rogers), availableat http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps73399/26411V1.pdf; see
also Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 264 (quoting An Examination of the Scope and Criteriafor Coverage under the Special Prvisionsof the Act, HearingBefore the Subcomm. on the Constitutionof the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 98 (2005) (statement of Armand Derfner) ("[Proposals ...
never even get off the ground because it's understood that they will not get precleared . . . . [Hlalf
the time, we never see what might happen and what would happen if we didn't have section 5.").
150. James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race on School FinanceReform, 98 MICH. L. REV. 432,
445-46 n.52 (1999) (finding that schools operating under desegregation decrees get a more equitable share of state revenue than do predominantly minority districts operating independently, and
"[tlhat [a] majority black district received additional funding only because of court [desegregation]
order cannot be gainsaid"); Cynthia Howell, McDaniel seeks school-suit hearing, ARK. DEMOCRATGAZETTE, May 20, 2009 (discussing funding consequences for school seeking unitary status).
151. See, e.g., Missoui v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 98-99 (1995) (suggesting lower court opinion
would enable the school district to continue to receive disproportionately high funding indefinitely);
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510-11 (1989) ("[T]here is a danger that a
racial classification is merely the product of unthinking stereotypes or a form of racial politics ....
[and that this tendency could] 'support a legislative preference for almost any ethnic, religious, or
racial group with the political strength to negotiate 'a piece of the action' for its members.'" (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 539 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
152. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 494 F. Supp. 2d 440, 450 (2007) (finding that the Democratic party chairman in Noxubee County had engaged in racially motivated manipulation of the
voting process in violation of Section 2 of the VRA, including racial appeals such as "You've got to
put blacks in office, our candidates, because we don't want white people over us anymore.").
153. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2688 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring) ("[A] reasonable
jury could easily find that the City's real reason for scrapping the test results was not a concern
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Alito's opinion posits that local officials manufactured a statutory construction as political cover for their actions.' In other words, the remedy itself
was facilitating dysfunction rather than helping to cure it.'
Whether or not this best explains what happened in New Haven,' Justice Alito is surely right that remedies give rise to varied incentives and
affect the exercise of local power in ways that are not always intended or
even productive. Operational remedies necessarily shape the decisionmaking universe in which local officials work.
As a result, key decision makers like Congress and the Court should focus on the ways in which longstanding remedies shape local decision
making and specifically on building robust structures of local governance.
Doing so promotes the devolution of power as the assumption of responsibility it should be.
C. NascentAdaptation

Congress, the Court, and other key decision makers have repeatedly evaluated longstanding remedies as if they must choose between all-or-nothing.
On occasion, however, they deviate from the dominant approach. This Section identifies two such examples.' The first is LULAC v. Perry, in which
the Court identified a violation of the VRA's Section 2 in unexpected circumstances. The second is the growing inclination by federal trial courts to
pass on the traditional remedy for racial vote dilution in favor of experiments with proportional systems. These examples are discussed below.
1. ProtectingEngagement in LULAC v. Perry

LULAC v. Perry surprised many observers when it held that a congressional redistricting plan adopted by Texas in 2003 violated Section 2 of the

about violating the disparate-impact provision of Title VII but a simple desire to please a politically
important racial constituency.").
154.

Id.

155. The willingness of state and local officials to lobby for outcomes that diminish their
autonomy is a recurring stance, but not one that has received systematic attention. See, e.g., Bartlett
v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1239-40 (2009) (noting that state's willingness to do so presented the
statutory question in an "unusual" posture); see also Parker, supra note 45, at 1211-13 (arguing that
school districts sometimes support continuation of desegregation decrees because of inertia, uncertainty about the future, financial considerations, or because they provide political cover).
156. See, e.g., Michael Zimmer, Ricci: Color-Blind Standards in a Race-Conscious Society?,
CONCURRING OPINIONs, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/11/ricci-color-blindstandards-in-a-race-conscious-society.html (Nov. 20, 2009 08:49 AM) (criticizing Justice Alito's
concurrence). But see The Nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11Ith Cong. 492 (2009)
(testimony of Peter Kirsanow) (suggesting Justice Alito rightly identified racial politics as the root
of the case).
157. See supra note 134 (discussing NAMUDNO as an example of suboptimal adaptation).
For additional, less recent examples, see Friedman, supra note 4, at 755 n.98.
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VRA.' The Court held that Texas caused racial vote dilution within the
meaning of Section 2 when it removed 100,000 Latino voters from a congressional district in Laredo in order to protect the Republican incumbent
these voters did not support. 5 9
LULAC was the first time the Court held specific conduct violated Section 2, a provision Congress had adopted in its present form back in 1982.,o
Before LULAC, the Court's stance towards Section 2 had been one of almost
relentless attrition, interspersed with repeated calls from Justices Thomas
and Scalia to repudiate entirely the statute's application to racial vote dilution."
LULAC was an odd case in which to change course. At issue was Texas's notorious foray into "re-redistricting," a patently partisan affair that
challenged the Court's hands-off approach to the problem of partisan gerrymandering. LULAC presented the Justices with numerous claims, the most
prominent of which was the charge that Texas violated the Equal Protection
Clause when it tossed out a viable districting plan adopted after the 2000
census in favor of a new plan that better served Republican interests. The
racial vote-dilution claims raised in Laredo and Forth Worth seemed to some
observers as both a distraction and a misguided attempt to "racialize" what
was fundamentally a partisan dispute.
Adding to the surprise, the race-based injury LULAC identified in Laredo was far from self-evident. The holding required the Justices to analyze
the factors comprising the Section 2 inquiry in a decidedly pro-plaintiff
manner and to resist the tendency of various lower courts to read these factors narrowly.'" For example, the "marked and continuous rise in Spanishsurnamed voter registration"' 5 that the Court found to exist in Laredo was
the sort of thing lower courts had repeatedly held to weigh against liability
under Section 2.'6 Such signs of healthy participation had been seen as evidence that a challenged electoral rule caused no harm to protected voters.1

158. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC v. Perry), 548 U.S. 399
(2006); see also Edward B. Foley, Election Law and the Roberts Court: An Introduction, 68 OHIo
ST. L.J. 733, 739 (2007) (describing identification of a Section 2 violation in LULAC as a "surprise").
159.

LULAC, 548 U.S. at 436-42.

160.

See Katz, supra note 89, at 1164.

161.

See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.

162.

See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.

163. Katz, supra note 89, at 1163 (discussing and disputing this stance and arguing that Texas
pursued its partisan agenda through race-based districting moves that relied on the close connection
between race and party in the state, and that the resulting claims of race-based injury were predictable consequence rather than an irrelevant distraction).
164.

Id. at 1168.

165.

LULAC, 548 U.S. at 439.

166.

Katz, supra note 89, at 1169.

167. E.g., Salas v. Sw. Tex. Junior Coll. Dist., 964 F.2d 1542, 1556 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Obviously, a protected class is not entitled to § 2 relief merely because it turns out in a lower percentage
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The LULAC majority, by contrast, suggested that rising voter registration
rates only strengthened the plaintiffs' case.
In fact, the belief that nascent political engagement requires cultivation
and hence protection best explains why the LULAC majority thought Texas
had injured Latino voters when it split the city in 2003.'6 Evidence showed
that Laredo's Latino voters were becoming increasingly politically active
and engaged, and that fueling this engagement was the prospect they might
soon elect a representative of choice. The new district line eliminated that
prospect, damaging the engagement it had engendered and thus giving rise
to what LULAC deemed to be a legally cognizable injury under Section 2.o
Liability under Section 2 had long hinged on many things,' 7 ' but until
LULAC, a "politically active" minority community had not been one of
them. Evidence of engagement weighed against liability until LULAC
adapted the reach of Section 2 and made this engagement something warranting cultivation through statutory protection.172 LULAC posits that the
statute protects "the progress of a racial group,""' and finds such progress
manifest in that group's increasing political activity. LULAC accordingly
opted to adapt the remedy so that it would help cultivate the community
itself as an institution of local governance. Reaching out to do so led a Court
long wary of Section 2 to acknowledge that race is not exclusively a problem to overcome but a trait that unites people in positive ways and gives rise
to communities that deserve protection. 74
Not everyone, to be sure, reads LULAC in this way. Markedly absent,
however, from the extensive debate the decision engendered is the critique
that emerged immediately upon NAMUDNO's issuance-namely, that the
Court construed the statute in a way that was implausible and inconsistent
with the judicial role. Section 2's substantive standard-protecting the ability
of minority voters to participate and elect representatives of choice-was
itself originally a judicial creation rather than a legislative one. More important, the statutory language, legislative history, and the Court's own

than whites to vote. Further, the high incidence of Hispanic registrationin the District is persuasive
evidence that Hispanic voters are not deterred from participation in the political process . . .
168.

LULAC, 548 U.S. at 438-40.

169. Not everyone agrees. See Richard H. Pildes, The Decline of Legally Mandated Minority
Representation,68 OHo. ST. L.J. 1139, 1142-44. But see Katz, supra note 89, at 1166-67 (arguing
discriminatory intent cannot adequately explain the Court's holding in LULAC).
Katz, supra note 89, at 1173.
171. Thirteen related but distinct factors have informed its application, with no single factor
carrying dispositive weight and several requiring subsidiary findings. See Johnson v. De Grandy,
512 U.S. 997, 1000 (1994) (articulating the concept of proportionality as part of the Section 2 inquiry); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (setting forth three preconditions to a
Section 2 inquiry); S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 20607 (listing seven factors plus two additional concerns that bear on the inquiry).
170.

172.

Katz, supra note 89, at 1173.

173.

LULAC, 548 U.S. at 403.

174.

Katz, supra note 89, at 1164-65.
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construction of it over the years allowed ample room for adaptations of the
regime of the sort LULAC may be read to promote.
A productive example of adaptation, LULAC embraced change in construing Section 2. That embrace, however, proved to be short-lived. Last
year, in Bartlett v. Strickland,"' the Court returned to its long-preferred approach to construing Section 2. It once again slashed the remedy. As in
LULAC, the Court again confronted evidence of improved participatory
conditions, but this time showed no interest in adapting the remedy to cultivate the improvements. Instead, Bartlett viewed the improvement at issue,
namely, the emergence of meaningful cross-racial political coalitions, not as
a condition to cultivate but instead as proof that the statute's remedial provisions were not needed. The tenets of attrition rather than adaptation once
again guided the way.7
2. Looking Beyond the Majority-MinorityDistrict

For several decades, federal law has required remedial action when
minority voters find themselves unable to elect candidates of choice
and certain other conditions exist."' The most common remedy federal
courts have ordered is the creation of districts in which minority voters
comprise the majority of the voting population.'79 In recent years, however,
a number of federal trial courts have rejected this remedy and allowed
instead experiments with proportional systems.8 While not without

175.

129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009).

176.

See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text.

177. See also Rick Hasen, Initial Thoughts on Bartlett v. Strickland: Narmwing the Voting
Rights Act to Save It?, ELECTION LAW BLOG (Mar. 9, 2009 09:03 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/
archives/013149.html (arguing that the court's opinion represented a "stingier" interpretation of the
VRA, that the application of the law was mechanical, and that the 50 percent criterion ignores more
meaningful voting demographic statistics).
178. The 1982 amendments to the VRA and the accompanying Senate report listed a host of
such conditions, making clear that no single one was required to establish that existing electoral
structures result in racial vote dilution. See Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (1982)
(amended 2006); S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982).
179. See, e.g., Gary M. Segura & Nathan D. Woods, Majority-Minority Districts, Co-Ethnic
Candidates,and Mobilization Effects, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006, supra
note 49, at 133, 133 ("[Clreating majority-minority districts has become the standard method for
securing minority representation in legislative institutions.").
180. Several dozen small jurisdictions now employ some form of proportional system as a
means to address racial vote dilution. See CTR. FOR VOTING AND DEMOCRACY, CUMULATIVE VOTING
AT WORK IN TEXAS, http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=167 (last visited Sept. 12, 2010); CENTER CTR.
FOR

VOTING

AND

DEMOCRACY,

FULL

AND

FAIR

REPRESENTATION
IN
ALABAMA,
CTR. FOR VOTING AND DEMOC-

http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=167 (last visited Sept. 12, 2010);
RACY,

THE

ONE

VOTE

SYSTEM:

NORTH

CAROLINA'S

MODEL

FOR

COMMUNITIES,

http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=167 (last visited Sept. 12, 2010); see also Consent Decree, United
States v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., No 9:09-80507-MARRA (S.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2009), available at
http://www.wpbf.com/download/2009/1027/21436503.pdf (consent decree adopting form of proportional voting in which voters cast one vote and the top four candidates are elected to the town
commission); Lake Park To Change Voting Method In 2010, W. PALM BEACH NEWS, Oct. 27, 2009,
availableat http://www.wpbf.com/news/21436468/detail.html.
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risk,"' these systems hold promise as a more sustainable means to foster
minority influence and a better way to engage voters. The willingness of
federal courts to allow these experiments reveals an inclination to adapt rather than terminate or simply continue the existing remedial regime.
The embrace of proportional systems reflects, in part, persistent skepticism about both the virtues and long-term viability of the majority-minority
district. While celebrated by some,182 these invariably safe Democratic districts have been widely criticized as suboptimal vehicles for productive
minority political participation." The move to proportional alternatives recognizes that such districts were never meant to be the exclusive remedy for
racial vote dilution under the VRA.'4
Proportional systems generally rely on voters rather than district lines as a
means to achieve minority representation. An example is cumulative voting, a
practice recently implemented in Port Chester, New York.'18 Under this system, voters are allotted six votes each and may choose how to distribute those
votes among the candidates running for the village's six-member governing
board of trustees. Voters may cast all six votes for a single candidate, they
may cast one vote for six different candidates, or they might distribute their

181. See, e.g., Patrick O'Donnell, Euclid schools havefirst election since court settlement, but
board remains all white, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 4, 2009, available at
http://www.cleveland.com/politics/index.ssf/2009/l1/post_4.html (documenting how a limited vote
system adopted as part of Section 2 remedial settlement and meant to increase minority representation nevertheless failed to secure the election of a black candidate to the school board).
182. For discussions about the benefits offered and secured by majority-minority districts, see
T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING AND REPRESENTATION 204-05, 261 (1999) (suggesting that
majority-minority districts provide a venue for political participation that itself erodes racial polarization among voters); Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on
Minority Representation: Black Officeholding in Southern State Legislatures and Congressional
Delegations, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SouTH 335 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman
eds., 1994); Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Questfor PoliticalEquality, 77 VA. L. REV.
1413, 1415-17 (1991); Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights
and Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 725, 740 (1998).
DAVID

183. Majority-minority districts have been condemned for the racial consciousness that informs their creation, the salient racial identity said to characterize operational districts, and the lack
of competition that generally prevails in these invariably safe Democratic districts. See, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 649-52 (3d ed. 2007). One longstanding
critique attributes Democratic losses and the resulting implementation of policies generally thought
to be unfavorable to minority communities on the majority-minority district, and the so-called
"bleaching" effect such districts are said to have on surrounding communities. See Grant M. Hayden, Resolving the Dilemma of Minority Representation, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1589, 1609 (2004);
Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a Century, 50 VAND. L. REV.
291, 314-20 (1997) (showing how majority-minority districts have assisted the Republican "Southern Strategy").
184. See Katz, supra note 89, at 1165 ("Thornburg v. Gingles, the authority often cited for the
contrary position, held only that the failure to create such a district in specified circumstances informs the question of liability under Section 2 [of the VRA] .... Gingles said nothing about how
violations of Section 2 might be remedied.").
185. United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, No. 06-CV-15173(SCR), 2010 WL 1326267
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2010) (combining the court's previous rulings from the liability and remedial
phases of the case, where the village was found to have diluted the voting strength of its growing
Hispanic community by using at-large elections and staggered terms to select the village's sixmember board of trustees).
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six votes among two or more candidates running for the board. The system
is meant to enable minority voters acting cohesively to concentrate or
"plump" their votes on a single candidate and thereby secure the election of
a candidate a majority of voters do not support.
As a means to foster minority representation, cumulative voting resembles the majority-minority district in that both are structured to allow
minority voters to coalesce behind a candidate who can win elective office
despite racial bloc voting and other barriers to minority participation in the
jurisdiction. If certain conditions exist, however, cumulative voting promises
to foster more competitive elections and more diverse cross-racial coalitions. In principle, at least, cumulative voting provides all candidates reason
to court minority votes. The practice, moreover, is facially race-neutral and
accordingly less vulnerable to criticism and legal attack than is the majorityminority district.
Cumulative voting nevertheless provides minority voters a less secure
"seat at the table" when policy is made.'8 1 It requires that voters both understand how to navigate the system and turn out to cast their ballots in
sufficient number to elect a candidate preferred by the minority but not the
majority of voters. 9 Recent experience shows that voters do not always do
this. Majority-minority districts, by contrast, require much less from voters
because the act of voting is less complex and both turnout and cohesiveness
are less important on election day.'" This difference may be why, in the Port
Chester litigation, the DOJ urged the trial court to replace the village's atlarge system with single-member districts in which Hispanic voters would
comprise the majority of voters in one district.
The village resisted this conventional remedy and pressed instead for
cumulative voting, arguing, among other things, that its small size made
186. Id. at *31-37. For a discussion of cumulative voting, see Cumulative Voting,
http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=563 (last visited Sept. 12, 2010).
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districted elections an awkward practice.192 The district court was willing to
allow the experiment, calling it a "legally acceptable" alternative.' 3 In so
doing, it recognized that conditions change, both in terms of the overarching
constitutional framework and with regard to the possibilities available to
minority voters to secure the representation they seek.
CONCLUSION
The election of Barack Obama as president in 2008 was met with repeated calls to terminate existing remedies for past racial discrimination.
Ward Connerly announced "that affirmative action is an idea whose time has
passed."'9 Ken Blackwell said that we have now conquered "endemic racism and overt hostility" such that "draconian laws" like the VRA are no
longer needed.'95 Abigail and Stephan Thernstrom saw Obama's election as
grounds to terminate "aggressive federal interference in state and local districting decisions" mandated by the VRA because "American voters have
turned a racial corner [and the] law should follow in their footsteps."'96

Those more favorably disposed to the remedial project countered that
nothing of importance had changed. 97 Gary Orfield pointed out that Obama's success is not proof "that the racial problems of this country have
been solved," and Wade Henderson insisted that "exceptions don't make the
rule."'98 Others emphasized the fact that John Kerry had done better than
Obama among white voters in certain parts of the South and that racially
polarized voting had persisted in both the primary and general elections.'"
This largely rhetorical debate on the significance of the Obama presidency mirrored the way Congress and the Court have long evaluated
existing remedies for past discrimination. Confronted with a starkly altered
landscape, advocates on both sides defined the possible options as all-ornothing, even though neither response was appropriate for the moment.
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Obama's election itself did not resolve many persistent problems that
still require attention and yet, it trivializes the accomplishment his election
represents to the nation to dismiss it as a mere exception. Obama was, to be
sure, a talented candidate running a well-financed campaign at a moment
where the stars arguably aligned for the Democratic nominee. But his election would have been impossible even in the very recent past. And, notably,
it would never have occurred but for the very remedial structures under contest.
When Representative John Lewis said that "Barack Obama is what
comes at the end of that bridge in Selma',200 he was not calling for the dismantling of the VRA, notwithstanding the fact that it was the disruption of a
civil rights march on that Selma bridge that first propelled Congress to enact
that remedial regime nearly a half century ago. Instead, Representative Lewis was signaling the existence of a political culture almost unimaginable
when many existing civil rights remedies were first instituted. Obama's election confirmed that the landscape has changed. Those changes demand a
more nuanced response than the all-or-nothing options that for too long have
defined the debate. Work remains to be done and the remedial project should
be adapted to do it.
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